Brazil, India, Egypt, South Korea
The two countries that are the focus of attention for those concerned about the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world are North Korea and Iran. However, over the last 20 years, other countries have also attracted the attention of experts. This is the case of Brazil, which refuses to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements and prevents the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) from making it a condition for the export of sensitive uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies. The NSG has also been weakened by the United States, which has succeeded in imposing an « Indian exception » to its export criteria.
Following the spectacular revelations in 2003 about Iran’s clandestine nuclear program, little attention has been paid to the less spectacular but nonetheless clear violations of safeguards that occurred in both South Korea and Egypt. In 2004, South Korea admitted to undeclared activities as it prepared to adopt its Additional Protocol. In that same year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) followed up on some open-source information about undeclared nuclear material and activities in Egypt. The IAEA reported in February 2005 that Egypt failed, inter alia, to declare 67 kg of imported UF4, 3 kg of uranium metal, 9.5 kg of imported thorium compounds, unirradiated fuel rods containing 10 percent enriched U-235 (some of which had been used in undeclared fuel dissolution experiments), and the undeclared irradiation of uranium and thorium targets that had been dissolved in three laboratories.
Clarifying the technical and statutory basis by which the IAEA exposes non-compliance is one immediate way the non-proliferation regime can be strengthened.
https://carnegieendowment.org/2009/06/02/iaea-reports-on-egypt-reluctantly-pub-23200
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/goldschmidt_survival20090201.pdf
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_01-02/Goldschmidt
“Business opportunities and threats in newborn nuclear nations” GDF SUEZ UNIVERSITY Nuclear Prospective Seminar Paris, 26 September 2008 https://carnegieendowment.org/files/gdf_suez_goldschmidt20080926.pdf
Brazil
India and "NSG"
Egypt and South Korea
Brazil: a nuclear threshold state rejecting the IAEA Additional Protocol
In 2009 I was invited to speak at an International Seminar jointly organized by the Nonproliferation for Global Security Foundation (NPSGlobal) and the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) in Rio de Janeiro on the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
On October 30, 2009, I participated to the last of the five panels on “The future of the NPT. Should it be enhanced, changed or replaced?” It was chaired by Gareth Evans. The speakers were Ramesh Takur, Gustavo Ainchil (from Argentina) and me.
In the oral presentation of a summary of my paper I questioned Brazil’s policy of refusing to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol (AP), and I concluded my speech by sayings:
Brazil is seeking a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and has received support from Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. There are strong indications that the U.S. is also willing to support Brazil’s inclusion, albeit without a veto right. Brazil can count on the support of many other states such as Indonesia, South Africa and, of course, the other members of the Group of Four (Germany, India and Japan).
As stated by The Economist last August, …
India and the GFN
The Biden administration has just reaffirmed its support for India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NFG), which now has 48 members, and reiterated its commitment « to continued engagement with like-minded partners. » sensitivity to advance this goal,” according to the Modi-Biden agreement document released by the White House on June 22, 2023.
Already in 2011, I denounced the decision taken by the GFN to authorize civilian nuclear trade with India, a country which has never joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a decision which undermines the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
I wrote in particular:
Today, the United States and India…
In 2004, South Korea admitted to carrying out undeclared activities as it prepared to adopt its additional protocol. The same year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) followed up on open source information regarding undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Egypt.
In February 2005, the IAEA reported that Egypt had failed to declare, among other things, 67 kg of imported UF4, 3 kg of uranium metal, 9.5 kg of imported thorium compounds, fuel rods containing 10% enriched U-235 (some of which had been used in undeclared fuel dissolution experiments), and undeclared irradiation of uranium targets and of thorium which had been dissolved in three laboratories.
Clarifying the technical and statutory basis on which the IAEA relies to denounce cases of violation of the Safeguards Agreements would make it possible to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.