My fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons
In the 15 years since I left the IAEA, and on the basis of the experience I gained there, I have written extensively on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). I have had periods of hope that my proposals would be adopted, as when Jean-Pierre Chevènement submitted my ideas to the French Senate in February 2010.
I also experienced periods of discouragement when, in 2013-2014, I privately debated my ideas with officials responsible for these issues, particularly in Germany and the Netherlands (the non-nuclear-weapon states where Urenco operates its uranium enrichment plants), the United Kingdom and the United States. The weakness of their arguments to justify their refusal to lead by example, as well as their lack of long-term vision, distressed me deeply.
If there is one document that best sums up my proposals, it is the one that, on 20 November 2019, Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), asked me to write in response to the following questions:
- How do you see the future of the NPT? Is there a risk to see the NPT falling apart and should we be concerned about that? Should the NPT be consolidated? or is everything fine as it is?
- Could we argue that any facilities or materials acquired while members, even domestically, may not be used for military purposes in perpetuity? (The point being that they were acquired with the understanding that they were for peaceful uses.)
- How can we make IAEA oversight a legal requirement in perpetuity?
- If countries do not agree to the application of IAEA inspections in perpetuity, should further sales to such countries be barred?
- The NPT does not contain enforcement measures. Are there realistic measures that could be adopted to ensure a definite response to violations so as to increase the deterrence value of the Treaty?
- How do you see the future?
Following this request, I wrote the study below, dated 23 January 2020:
Dealing Preventively with NPT Withdrawal
It reiterates several elements included in an article published in 2015 on « Securing Irreversible IAEA Safeguards to Close the Next NPT Loophole. »