

**CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT  
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

**CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL  
NONPROLIFERATION CONFERENCE**

**11:00 A.M. – 12:20 P.M.  
EUROPEAN PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING THE  
NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME**

**CHAIR: MUSTAFA KIBAROGLU,  
BILKENT UNIVERSITY**

**MARTIN BRIENS,  
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FRANCE**

**AMBASSADOR NABIL FAHMY,  
EMBASSY OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT  
TO THE UNITED STATES**

**PIERRE GOLDSCHMIDT,  
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

**TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 2007  
RONALD REAGAN BUILDING  
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTER  
AMPHITHEATRE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

*Transcript by:  
Federal News Service  
Washington, D.C.*

MUSTAFA KIBAROGLU: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Mustafa Kibaroglu from Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey. I have the honor of chairing this session about European Proposals for Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime. Strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime requires properly addressing a host of issues such as overcoming the institutional deficit of the NPT, enhancing the detection ability of the IAEA safeguards, making a distinction between non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards and non-compliance with the NPT obligations, establishing a structure mechanism for withdrawals from the NPT, presenting the breakout scenarios by constraining the nuclear fuel cycles of suspected states, and issuing negative secured assurances as well as advancing the disarmament agenda by the nuclear weapons states.

Europeans are perceived both as being part of the problem in all these respects due to, among others, the presence of nuclear-weapon states who upgrade their nuclear arsenals. And they are also perceived as part of the solution with new prospects for the future due to the joint strategy and the action plan adopted by the European Union, which should be fully implemented, of course.

We have three distinguished speakers on this panel and I would like to briefly introduce them by reading their short résumés. And you can find my résumé on page 40 of the book that is distributed to you at the beginning. Well, in the order of speaking today, Martin Briens is the first speaker and he is the director of nuclear nonproliferation division in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was just appointed to this post, so congratulations with his new position.

Before assuming this role he was the deputy director of the Office of Post-Planning in the Ministry, and he was also deputy director of the – (unintelligible) – at the Prevision in Paris. He has also served as the counselor in charge of political-military affairs at the French embassy in Washington, D.C., between 2003-2006, at the French embassy in Beijing between 1999-2003, and at the Department of Strategic Security and Disarmament Affairs in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris in '96-'99. He has graduated from the National School of Administration in 1996.

Our second speaker today is Mr. Pierre Goldschmidt who is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goldschmidt is also a member of the board of directors for the Association Vinçotte Nuclear, the AVN, which is a nonprofit authorized inspection organization charged with verifying compliance of nuclear power plants with Belgian safety regulations. Mr. Goldschmidt was the deputy director general and head of the Department of Safeguards at the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1999 to June 2005.

Before the IAEA, Mr. Goldschmidt was for 12 years the director general of SYNATOM, the company responsible for the fuel supply and spent fuel management of

seven Belgian nuclear plants. For six years, Mr. Goldschmidt was a member of the directoire of Eurodif, the French uranium enrichment company. Mr. Goldschmidt has headed numerous European and international committees, including serving as chairman of the Uranium Institute in London and chairman of the Advisory Committee of the EURATOM Supply Agency.

Our last speaker today will be Mr. Ambassador Nabil Fahmy, who has been the Arab Republic of Egypt's ambassador to the United States since October, 1999. He is a career diplomat who has played an active role in the numerous efforts to bring peace to the Middle East as well as in international and regional disarmament affairs. Mr. Ambassador Fahmy has also served as Egypt's ambassador to Japan and was the political advisor to the foreign minister. And over the years, he has been a member of the Egyptian missions to the United Nations relating to disarmament and political affairs in Geneva, in New York, and has held numerous posts in the Egyptian government.

Mr. Ambassador Fahmy headed the Egyptian delegation to the Middle East Peace Process Steering Committee in 1993 and Egyptian delegation to the multilateral working group on regional security and arms control emanating from the Madrid Peace Conference beginning in December 1991. He was elected vice chairman of the First Committee on Disarmament and in national security affairs of the 44<sup>th</sup> Session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1986. From 1999 until 2003, Mr. Ambassador Nabil Fahmy was a member of the U.N. secretary general's advisory board of disarmament matters and served as its chairman in 2001.

Mr. Ambassador Fahmy has written extensively on Middle East politics, peace making, and regional security and disarmament. He received his Bachelor of Science degree in Physics Mathematic and his Master of Arts degree in management both from the American University in Cairo.

So I would like to invite the first speaker and ask him to make his presentation in 20 minutes. Thank you.

MARTIN BRIENS: Thank you very much, Mustafa. Maybe I will start by talking a little bit about Europe and the EU because, especially seen from here, the EU might appear as, again, a weird animal – weird but quite interesting – a bit weird because it's neither a super state nor an international organization. It's something in between which means, in terms of foreign policy, that you have – I mean, that member states have their own foreign policy, more and more these foreign policies coordinated at the EU level. And you have also more and more common foreign policy.

So when you are talking about European proposals for strengthening the nonproliferation regime, you have to think about what the EU does and what the EU member states do as well. The second characteristic is about the institutional certainties of the EU mechanism. You have the EU Council, you have the EU Commission, and they have specific tools to deal with nonproliferation issues.

The third feature of the EU is the diversity among its members. You have objective differences such as, for example, the fact that you have two nuclear weapons state and 25 non-nuclear weapons states. And also you have a large majority of countries which are very committed to the development of nuclear energy and some others which are less interested in the development of nuclear energy. But it's really what makes the EU really interesting is its ability to identify common interests among its members and also manage differences.

So the first point I would like to make is that Europe is playing an increasing role on nonproliferation. Sometimes it's very visible, such as the leading role of Europe in the Iranian nuclear crisis, and sometimes it's less visible but still pretty effective. As you've been able to see in the past few years, Europe has played a central role in the Iranian nuclear crisis. It's Germany, the UK, and France which took the lead in July 2003 to try to respond to the Iranian nuclear challenge. And we are very glad to see, in June 2006, Russia, China, and the U.S. joining the initiative which has now become the E3 plus three initiative.

And also you've probably – you know that Javier Solana, the EU high representative, is the one talking to the Iranians on behalf of the six. And I would also mention that recently, and it is little known, the EU not only implemented UNSC resolutions 7037 and 7047, but took additional steps which went beyond what was required in the resolutions.

But the EU also is doing things which are less visible – for example, to implement the EU strategy against WMD proliferation. This strategy was adopted in December 2003 and the high representative designated a personal representative, Mrs. Anaysa Shenera (ph), who's here, to implement the WMD strategy. And in this framework, the EU did a number of things which are sometimes quite new, such as inserting a nonproliferation provision in its trade and cooperation agreements. And today, there is a nonproliferation provision in more than 90 of these agreements.

The EU is also supporting major nonproliferation institutions such as the IAEA, the OPCW, and also has launched a number of programs to assist countries so that they can abide by their commitments – so programs on physical security, border controls, export controls, et cetera. So my second point would be more of a question: is there a European approach to nonproliferation, which would be, for example, different for the U.S. approach on nonproliferation?

I will say the goals are the same, but the ways might be slightly different. And it's true that in the EU framework we tend to put more emphasis on the multilateral approach as underlined in the EU security strategy adopted as well in 2003, which insists on effective multilateralism. And if there is an area in which effective multilateralism must mean something, it's nonproliferation which means that we must transcend the regime, promote its universalization, foster compliance, and also help countries to abide by their commitments.

The second – maybe the second feature of this European approach to nonproliferation may be the fact that also we favor a balanced approach, as you know, between the different aspect of the nonproliferation regime, nonproliferation disarmament corporation. And the third feature might be also a concern not to create new dividing lines. There are, as you know, much criticism against the nonproliferation regime which is deemed by some people as discriminatory. It is to some respect, but it's important, we think not to create additional dividing lines, not to create haves and have nots. And I think it's very important.

So now let me turn to what we think, both at the EU level and also at the individual member states level, what could be done to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Of course, the first thing to look at is what needs to be done. What's the health status of the regime? I think there are two ways to interpret the current situation of the regime: it's the glass half empty and the glass half full. The glass half empty looks like the following: Iran and North Korea represents very strong challenges to the regime and the regime might on the verge of collapsing. And the glass half full is that we have two very hard cases left. But apart from this, the regime is making progress. Nuclear proliferation has been mostly contained. And even in the case of India, for example, there are efforts going on to try to bring India closer to the proliferation regime.

I think those two assessments are not completely exclusive and the future of the nonproliferation regime will depend a lot on the way we deal with Iran and North Korea. And I'll come back to that later. Just to sum up about the nonproliferation regime, I think it's facing now five main challenges: the ongoing North Korean and the Iranian nuclear programs. It's the nonproliferation regime's own weaknesses, for example, the fact that there are no multilateral norms governing missiles or no inspection mechanism in the missile and biological areas. There are also some legitimacy concerns rising from perception of discrimination among haves and have-nots. Also, the consequences of the spread of science and technology in a globalized economy. And last, I would say lack of effectiveness against new proliferation strategies, and we saw with the A. Q. Khan network what it means.

So what can we do now to respond to these challenges and, hence, to prevent an erosion of the nonproliferation regime? I will say first the priority will be in the way we deal with the North Korean and the Iran challenges. We need to foster compliance. And in the case of North Korea, it's very important that resolution 1718 be implemented. And now we see some prospect of resumption of the six-party talks. And I think we have to be very vigilant about the way it's going to be implemented – the February 13th agreements are going to be implemented. And that is going to effectively to do complete verifiable and irreversible end of the North Korean nuclear weapons program.

On Iran, as you now – after Iran did not comply to the UNSC request to suspend its uranium enrichment activities, the UNSC agreed twice in four months to take measures to encourage Iran to go back to the negotiating table. Now with Iran still openly challenging UNSC demands, at this point we have no choice left but to work on a

new resolution. But at the same time, the door of negotiations remains open should Iran take the right decision.

So my point here is that what would be most needed to strengthen the nonproliferation regime as a collective will from all nations to address this challenge. And we must use all the possibilities offered by the U.N. Charter and the UNSC to ensure compliance. And it's important because we must also demonstrate that nonproliferation is not only an issue for the West but it's an issue for the international community as a whole.

Beyond these two hard cases, a number of steps can be taken to improve the regime. First: by increasing the cost of noncompliance. I'll give you an example: the proposal to make withdrawal from the NPT more difficult. Proposal – I mean, France and Germany tabled a proposal on this at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Of course, nobody is going to forbid withdrawal, because it's a sovereign right. But still, we can make it more costly, more difficult to justify. And under this proposal, two key principals would be agreed.

First one: a state should remain internationally liable for any violations committed while under the NPT. And also as a matter of principle, all materials, equipments, technologies, and facilities should remain restricted to peaceful uses only and remain subject to IAEA safeguards after withdrawal.

Second: we also have to strengthen verification mechanism by fully supporting the IAEA and the OPCW. And the EU is committed to that and is assisting the IAEA and the OPCW. To strengthen the regime, we must also adopt new norms such as a fissile material cutoff at – (unintelligible) – and Geneva. And France, as well as the EU as a whole, is supporting the early launching – the early opening of the negotiation of such a treaty as soon as possible. We need also to work concretely against – I mean, to work concretely for nuclear security and, for example, the EU and EU members are major contributors to the G8 Global Partnership and probably more efforts can be done in this field.

Another thing we have to do is to make sure that the development of nuclear energy in the world is not going to lead to more proliferation, which means concretely limiting access to the most sensitive fuel cycle technologies. But our approach on this might be slightly different from the ones in the U.S. Rather than forbidding forever transfers of technology in this field, which we think would only increase resentment against the nonproliferation regime and thus would probably not work – we think it would more effective to define strong criteria for allowing exports of enrichment and repossessing technologies. Criteria such as credible nuclear power generation program or addition to the IAEA standards of nonproliferation, nuclear security and safety, et cetera.

This is a proposal France has put forward in the NSG and which is very widely supported. And we think it should be adopted as early as possible. We need also to reassure countries – we choose not to acquire these technologies, I mean, enrichment and

reprocessing – that they will have a reliable access to nuclear fuel services. Hence, the proposal France, a number of European countries, and U.S. made in June last year to provide credible guaranties of supply of nuclear fuel. And this proposal – and there are many other proposals like this on the table, but they are aimed at reconciling the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and are a nonproliferation concern. And what we need to do is really create a virtual cycle where nonproliferation requirements and the development of nuclear energy go together and one allowing the other.

The last thing we need to do is to reinforce operational corporation in informal frameworks such as the PSI, export control groups – such as the NSG, the MTCR, et cetera. We need to act against proliferation every day by beefing up export controls towards illicit procurement attempts, intercepting WMD related shipments, disrupting the financing of WMD activities.

EU countries are part of all these arrangements or informal groups and most of them are working on that. And I think it's important – it will be important also for the EU as a whole to be part of these initiatives. And already there's an agreement that the EU is going to be part of the Global Initiative for Combating Nuclear Terrorism. And we think it will be very useful also for the EU as a whole to be part of the PSI, for example, which is not the case today.

Just to conclude, I will say that we also must not forget that proliferation and nonproliferation are not separated from the rest of security and political considerations. And everything the international community will do to solve conflicts and to reduce regional tensions will improve the sense of security of some nations and also lessen the need for strategy hedging. And this is, of course, especially true for the Middle East region. So what we need to promote, in our view, is collective security, and this is one of the basic principles on which the EU integration is based upon. And so, it should come as no surprise that this is some thing the EU wants to promote in its foreign policy, including on nonproliferation. Thank you.

MR. KIBAROGLU: Thank you, Martin. (Applause.)

Monsieur Goldschmidt?

PIERRE GOLDSCHMIDT: Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. What I'm going to say today does not represent European views as might be inferred from the title of this session but only the views of a European. Many constructive recommendations have been made on how to strengthen the nonproliferation regime, in particular, during the NPT Review Conference in 2000 and 2005 but also since then.

In this short presentation I will limit myself to what I consider to be three priorities: ratifying the CTBT, addressing cases of noncompliance, and trying to dissuade states to withdraw from the NPT. Progress on these issues will depend to a large extent to the political will of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. More

than other countries, they need to take the responsibility to lead the world by example. To date, 138 states have ratified the CTBT. For this most important treaty to come into force, it still needs to be ratified by the following 10 states [China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States]. This should be a priority in the field of nuclear nonproliferation.

It is the primary responsibility of nuclear-weapon states to convince the world that nuclear weapons will progressively become obsolete and irrelevant to their future security strategy, and that, therefore, nuclear-weapon states neither need nor intend to disregard the NPT commitments by developing and testing new types of nuclear weapons. Until more convincing progress is made in the area of irreversible nuclear disarmament, many non-nuclear-weapon states – and we heard that many times already during this conference – many non-nuclear-weapon states will no doubt continue to oppose highly desirable tightening measures of the nonproliferation regime.

The very first concrete step should be for the United States and China to ratify the CTBT as has already been done by the other nuclear-weapon states – France, Russia, and the UK. Ratifying the CTBT, the very first of the 13 practical steps agreed by consensus by the 2000 NPT Review Conference, is the most convincing indicator of the nuclear-weapons states' willingness to comply with their NPT article VI disarmament undertakings.

Once the CTBT has been ratified by all nuclear-weapon states, it will be even more logical to request that India ratify the treaty as a condition for any nuclear cooperation with supplier countries. In those circumstances, the chances that India would agree would be much higher provided, of course, that Pakistan does so, too.

Many non-nuclear weapons states, particularly from the Non-Aligned Movement, have been quite vocal in expressing their frustration, not only about the lack of progress by the five nuclear weapons states with regard to the implementation of the 13 practical steps referred to above, but also about the legal double standard between non-nuclear-weapon states that are party to the NPT and the three states that are not – India, Israel, and Pakistan. It is, therefore, quite astonishing that these NAM states have not been more vocal in objecting to the July 2005 U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with India.

This agreement grants India all the benefits that are specifically reserved to non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT without requesting India any real counterbalancing nonproliferation and disarmament commitment, not even those undertaken by nuclear-weapon states under the NPT. The minimum that should be requested from India is to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay. If it's too late for the U.S. to impose such a condition, there is still time for the NSG to make it an inescapable export condition.

If this U.S.-India deal goes through, it will make it politically impossible to strengthen the nonproliferation regime, and any hope to create a WMD-free zone in the Middle East will become even more unlikely. Establishing such a WMD-free zone in the Middle East is obviously a desirable long-term objective. However, everyone knows that



in order to reach that stage, a series of difficult political steps need to be taken and that it will likely take decades to be achieved.

A first important milestone on this long road would be for all states in the region that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT, in particular Israel, Iran, and Egypt. I would suggest that this would particularly be in Egypt's interest and that the latter should use its diplomatic leverage to reach that goal instead of appearing as a leader among those opposing badly needed measures to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

Another important case relates to North Korea. The so-called six-party talks that resulted in the Joint Statements of September 2005 and February 2007 have, as their goal, I quote "the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner" end quote. The ratification of the CTBT by North Korea would be a logical and important step and should therefore be mentioned explicitly in future discussions. Here again, the ratification of the CTBT by the U.S. and China would make progress in this direction much more likely.

For any party to the NPT to delay or obstruct the entry into force of the CTBT is, I believe, incompatible with the spirit of the NPT and with the basic undertakings of its signatories. And finally, there is no reason to believe that Colombia and Indonesia would be the last of the 44 states that have to ratify the CTBT before it enters into force. And all 10 countries are indicated in yellow on this slide.

Nuclear supplier states, within or outside the NSG, should undertake not to provide any nuclear energy cooperation to any state that has not ratified the CTBT. They would thereby demonstrate that they are ready to give priority to their nonproliferation undertakings for the sake of international peace and security in the long term rather than to their short-term economic interests.

Experience with both North Korea and Iran has shown that in order to conclude in a timely manner that there are no undeclared nuclear material or activities in a state as a whole after a state had been found by the IAEA to be deliberately in noncompliance with its safeguards undertakings, the agency needs verification rights extending beyond those of comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. Acknowledging this in September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted the resolution urging Iran, I quote, "to implement transparency measures which extend beyond the formal requirement of the safeguard agreement and additional protocol," end quote, as a means to more efficiently determine the peaceful nature of Iran's program.

The problem is that such IAEA Board resolutions do not provide the agency with any additional legally binding verification authority. The most effective, unbiased and feasible way to establish a legal basis for the necessary verification measures in circumstances of noncompliance is for the U.N. Security Council to adopt under Chapter 7 a generic and legally binding resolution stating that if a state is reported by the IAEA to be noncompliance, the following three actions would result.

First: the noncompliant state would have to suspend all sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities for a specified period of time, but it could continue to produce electricity from operating nuclear power plants. Second: if requested by the IAEA, the U.N. Security Council would automatically adopt a specific resolution, under Article 41 of the Charter, making it mandatory for the non-complying state to provide the agency with the necessary additional verification authority.

Areas in which the verification authority should increase would include assurance to prompt access to persons, broader and prompt access to locations, access to original documents and copies thereof, and broader and faster access to information as well as the lifting of other types of restrictions. Such authority would last until the agency could conclude that there is no undeclared nuclear material and activity in the state and that its declarations to the agency are correct and complete.

Finally: no nuclear material would henceforth be delivered to that state without the guarantee that all nuclear material equipment and facilities declared to the IAEA would remain under agency safeguards even if – as I will indicate in a minute – the state withdraws from the NPT.

Parties to the NPT have the right – inalienable right -- pursuant to article 10 to withdraw within three months from the treaty. However, it would be logical to forbid withdrawing countries the free use, possibly for military purposes, of nuclear material and equipment delivered to them while and because they were party to the treaty. It is therefore important to guarantee that such material and equipment remain under IAEA safeguards even if a state withdraws from the NPT.

To address this issue, supplier states should, from now on, include in their national law the requirement that nuclear material and specified equipment can only be delivered to a non-nuclear-weapons state if they are using facilities that are subject to INFCIRC-66 type safeguards agreement concluded with the IAEA. Now, these agreements which do not lapse if a state withdraws from the NPT, would normally be subsumed to the recipient state's comprehensive safeguards agreement and would only be activated in case the state withdraws from the NPT. The NSG should progressively make this a mandatory export condition starting with all deliveries related to sensitive fuel cycle facilities such as uranium conversion, enrichment, or reprocessing plants.

Another possible measure to cope with the risk that a withdrawing state could use previously supplied nuclear material and equipment for military purposes would be for all nuclear supplier states to include in their bilateral nuclear supplier arrangement and corresponding contracts an obligation for the recipient state to return such material and equipment to the original supplier in case of withdrawal from the NPT. And as you probably know, this is not a new concept. There are similar provisions in the IAEA statute.

A particularly threatening case for international peace and security is the withdrawal of a non-nuclear weapons state from the NPT after having been found by the

IAEA in breach of its obligation to comply with its safeguards agreement. In such a case, it is of paramount importance for the U.N. Security Council to convene immediately in order to consider what appropriate measures should be taken, and not – as was the case with North Korea – three years after its withdrawal when it tested a nuclear device. We must by all means avoid a repetition of this unfortunate chain of events.

Therefore, the U.N. Security Council should adopt another generic and legally binding resolution stating that if a state withdraws from the NPT after being found by the IAEA to be in noncompliance with its safeguard undertakings, then such withdrawal constitute a threat to international peace and security as defined under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. This generic resolution should also provide that under these circumstances all material and equipment made available to such a state under a comprehensive safeguard agreement would have to be forthwith removed from that state under IAEA supervision and remain under safeguards.

And finally, the resolution should request that all military cooperation with a withdrawing state be automatically suspended. No one disputes that the nonproliferation regime, to maintain its credibility, needs to be strengthened in order to cope with new technical challenges and proliferation risks including those potentially raised by non-state actors.

The three proposals made here are addressing real practical issues and are based on lessons learned from past experience. They are fully compatible and in line with the letter and the spirit of the NPT and should be in the interest of all states that have no intention of developing nuclear weapons. It is more than time to move from easy incantatory declarations to concrete action. This is our collective responsibility and the European Union, with its 27 states, has a prominent role to play. Where there is a will, there is a way. Thank you. (Applause.)

MR. KIBAROGLU: These two presentations were from Europe. Maybe a presentation from the Middle East would be complementary.

AMB. NABIL FAHMY: Thank you. Thank you, chairman. Let me start by sort of putting a question. I'm not exactly sure why I'm being asked to speak about European proposals – maybe because Egypt's near Europe or because we've been occupied by the European powers over the years. But I'll try to engage from the perspective that we consider our relationship with Europe to be fundamental and, consequently, have a constructive ongoing dialogue with them on many, many issues. But I'd also add that I think the non-proliferation issues generally are important too all regions so I'm happy to engage in commentary or suggestions as invited even if they don't relate directly in a vigilant manner to my own region.

I think we've listened to a set of extremely interesting proposals and ideas. And I remember at the beginning of this conference yesterday, we were asked to be provocative. So I'm going to start by being provocative and then commenting. I come from a completely different angle on these issues. I do not intend to nor am I implying

that any of the proposals do not merit very serious consideration – I think they all do – but they tend to focus on the proliferation part of the problem as the way to bolster the NPT. And I actually think the problem with the NPT is the lack of progress on the disarmament part of the problem.

The fundamental problem at the NPT – it's weakness – the reason it's losing credibility is because there's been so little work done on the disarmament part of the package. And then you see the things that our first speaker spoke about; for example, the feeling that there is a disparity between the haves and the have nots and all those things that be correctly said should not be accepted.

So my first point, frankly, is: if we truly want to deal with bolstering the NPT in the eyes of the world generally much more focus needs to be on disarmament. Secondly: most of the ideas suggested today, and others that are being discussed internationally, will make it more difficult for people to cheat who don't want to cheat. It will make it much more complicated for those who do not have a clear motivation to go nuclear – not to do so, the cost will increase. But it will not stop those who actually want to pursue a nuclear weapons program.

Let me rephrase that. It will not stop the pursuit of nuclear weapons by members of the NPT or outside the NPT, because they do not deal with the reasons behind the pursuit of nuclear weapons which are fundamentally security reasons. The essence of any drive to – or the most important element of any drive to pursue a nuclear weapons program is security. One can look at prestige and all that, but at the end of the day, it's a general determination of security in the longer sense. So unless we deal with the security issues, I think, we're targeting the wrong approach and wrong people with many of these measures, although there is some spill-off effect into proliferators.

To build on my point – and I think both of my colleagues also mentioned this – the five Permanent Members of the Security Council have a particularly important role to play here, because they are all nuclear-weapon states. And frankly, if they don't engage in a serious attempt to pursue nuclear disarmament, all of their laudable requests for the world to tighten up the process ultimately will not succeed.

Let me, in that respect, make the following suggestion. In terms of the nuclear-weapon states, I actually don't see why they cannot commit to attempting to achieve nuclear disarmament within 25 years. And I don't see – what is the risk, what's the cost of failure in that respect? If they are truly committed to their NPT commitments, then a political commitment to negotiate and try to achieve nuclear disarmament within 25 years, I think, is a very tenable long-term – I underline long-term, not short-term – objective.

And I think they need to setup a negotiating process which involves them and others on the different elements of how to get there. It was mentioned that I'm from the Middle East – and we keep getting told about roadmaps for the Middle East – and I

suggest we have a roadmap for nuclear disarmament as well, co-sponsored and embraced by the nuclear weapon states in particular.

The other part of that package is that the drive, again, for pursuing nuclear weapons programs in different regions is regional. In the new cases, states are not trying to compete with America, with Russia, with France or England, most of the time not even trying to compete with China, although there are exceptions here. So in essence, the drive is regional and, therefore, engaging in serious attempts to discuss regional security concerns, I think, is a parallel track that needs to be dealt with, and those attempts will differ from one region to the other. Complications that relate to the Middle East are different from those that would relate to situation of where you'd have India and Pakistan engaged in that kind of dialogue or India, Pakistan and China, a situation where you'd have Japan, North Korea, the Korean Peninsula, including other parties as well. So I think the parallel track on disarmament should actually be a more energetic attempt to focus on region security concerns, generally and regional disarmament issues that relate to nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

Now, it's been mentioned by Mr. Goldschmidt that establishing a zone free of these weapons in the Middle East as a long term objective is, of course, a good proposal, and I agree with him. We actually are the ones who have submitted that proposal, but I'm not talking only about the Middle East. I actually think we need to do this globally and have a two-track approach to disarmament, which would involve NPT members and non-NPT members. I'm not suggesting that the NPT members alone discuss the issue of nuclear disarmament. I'm looking at different packages for different areas depending on what the security situation is, but we need to engage on these issues.

The other point I wanted really to focus on is this issue of how to make it more difficult, and also the issue of how to ensure we do not create an increased system of haves and have-nots. First on the issue of make it more difficult, the – I for example support completely the idea of trying to foster compliance and of raising the cost of non-compliance, but I think applying that only to NPT members, again misses the point. You will encourage parties not to join treaties, if you only make it difficult for those who join such treaties and not focus on those who do not join treaties. So if we were to apply those kind of standards, members of the NPT would have to apply the same standards in their relations with other countries outside the treaty itself.

Let me also dwell on Pierre's point about Security Council resolutions and the rights of states to their nuclear material once they withdrew from a set treaty. It's a very interesting point. Let me add to that. There's also been a discussion, should we actually prohibit withdrawal from treaties, make members to those treaties permanently. I'm not suggesting that you made that point. I would simply comment on that that I think it would be the kiss of death to multilateralism in arms control if every entry point was one-sided and there's no way out, and every one of us would link entry into a treaty with everything else around us and you'd end up with membership being very little.

But Pierre raises an important point in terms of what should be the situation if a state withdraws from a treaty. My position is withdrawal from the treaty is completely legal and legitimate if it consists with the requirements; in other words, the NPT national security requirements, and I don't think that there should be consequences if a country withdraws from a treaty like the NPT while having been compliant to its safeguard responsibilities. And I think they should have full right to use whatever materials it has defined by the agreements reached, as long as during the period that it was a member of the NPT or any treaty, it remained compliant.

On the other hand, I agree with him that if a party to a treaty is found non-compliant, there has to be consequences. You cannot be found to have cheated on your obligations and gotten away with it, then justify that you can simply build on that process, so is it best to do that through a generic Security Council resolution or other procedures? It has to be discussed. It's a serious proposal. I think there will be complications in terms of the nature of the Security Council, but we have all accepted that it is the main body responsible for (international ?) peace and security, so I would expect that the Council would have a role to play in that.

The other point I'm really concerned about, and I think again the point was made by Pierre that why haven't a number of states spoken out more of the U.S.-India agreement. Well, again, I believe that if you pursue nuclear disarmament in a serious manner, you pursue the peaceful cooperation in nuclear – and peaceful use of nuclear technology under safeguarded procedures, we can work towards the objective of achieving a nuclear free world. We recognize that countries like India chose not to join the NPT, and consequently they are not bound by the agreements. We don't criticize them for their sovereign decision or for entering an agreement with the U.S. that gives them rights that they were able to negotiate. That does not negate the fact that if you look at the optics of such an agreement from the perspective on an NPT member – an NPT member must be concerned with the implications that such a bilateral agreement would have on the credibility of the NPT. It's not criticism of India, but it is clearly a very negative message to others who have decided to join the NPT or other such agreements, the fact that an NPT member (USA) would enter such an agreement.

Now, again, this is a delicate issue. Countries can pursue their sovereign rights, and as long as they have done that legally and in a compliant manner, there's only so much you can do by way of persuasion. You cannot force them to take obligations. So we are concerned with ramifications of the agreement of the NPT, but we're not going to criticize India for negotiating a good deal if that's what this ultimately turns out to be from their perspective.

I would add however that we don't believe that sovereign choices of governments are something that we can leave without global or regional consequence. And I'm not going to debate or challenge countries' rights to take decisions, but I will debate challenge and try to influence their motivation. We will always pursue relations with states in order to push them to pursue nuclear weapons programs, so that would apply to India, it also applies to Israel, not in terms of their right to take decisions, but the

motivation behind that, and that brings me back to my very first point, that unless you deal with the security issues, you end up putting out formulas there that simply make it a bit more cumbersome, a bit more difficult for those who are already cooperating with you, but you will not solve the problem that is generating the nuclear arms race.

And I think that's frankly what ultimately leads us to slowly become more frustrated about nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, and I've come to these conferences often. Every year we hear those who call for nuclear disarmament and all that, and then we hear people saying, well, let's be practical and let's just do what we can. Well, why don't you take the high road and that will help others move forward. It hasn't succeeded, and while we need to be practical and deal with immediate problems, because we can't ignore them, such as nuclear terrorism, that cannot be at the expense of the strategic objectives, and that's where I think our main failure has been. We've allowed the spinoff and technical problems to overwhelm the more serious issue which is the fundamental challenge, and ultimately technology or politics have a way of moving around them.

I'm always inclined to take a few minutes to talk about the Middle East. I actually won't at this point. I'm sure it will come up in questions, if people are interested, and I'll deal with it then, but I want to go back and to close by saying that unless the permanent five become much more active on nuclear disarmament, unless they put together a clear path in which people start feeling once again that nuclear nonproliferation is to their disadvantage and that they can find security through other means, as we have in the past, you will see more nuclear weapon states, because the pursuit of nuclear weapons, by the five or by anybody else, is driven by security, and if people feel a sense of insecurity, and can't find a way to respond to that, that option will remain on the table. I think yesterday, George Perkovich, in his introduction – I'm not going to quote him, because I just forgot the words he used, but as since he focused on the importance of delegitimizing nuclear weapons, I think that's something which we need to do much more seriously, otherwise, a couple of years from now we will meet here and you will count some more weapon states out there and I dread that circumstance. Thank you. (Applause.)

MR. KIBAROGLU: I would like to thank all three panelists for their excellent presentations, also for taking care of our time constraints, time limitation. Before turning to the audience, I would like to ask a very brief question to Martin if I could, but I will again like to thank all the panelists for addressing almost each of the points that I raised at the beginning in the first brief statement of the panel, especially issues of noncompliance and withdrawal desires, notorious issues, and answers are not really easy to come, and we have seen some divergent views already, and I believe there will be some comments and contributions from the floor.

My very quick question to Martin is – actually, since I'm curious about the situation with Iran and the negotiations between Iran and the Europeans, and actually you said, EU countries have taken additional steps that have gone beyond the U.N. Security Council resolutions. Could you be more specific as to what kind of steps these were?

MR. BRIENS: Yes. For example, we have wider lists of entities, individuals targeted, and also we apply the – (unintelligible) – regulations list of items, which is not the case in the – (unintelligible) – of the UN, SCR 1737 and – sorry – so it's much broader in the scope.

MR. KIBAROGLU: Thank you. So turning to the audience to get perhaps two questions at a time if I may, and then their answers then proceed like this. Thanks.

Q: I'm Sally Horn. I'm a consultant with the State Department. This is quite an interesting panel to listen to, and I sat in on a panel that was in this room before about taking nuclear disarmament seriously and I see a connection, and I'd like in particular to ask Ambassador Fahmy to address it. In the previous panel, two of the speakers spoke about the difficulties in achieving total nuclear disarmament and they focused in particular on some of the particularly difficult policies as well as technical security challenges associated with trying to go to zero.

In your remarks you spoke also about the security challenges, and the security issues associated with nuclear disarmament, and one of the things that struck me in particular was the comment that you made about those states who are pursuing, or may be pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities, and you stated that their motivation is security issues, then you jump to the question of the role of the P5 and suggested that the P5 need to engage in a more serious pursuit of nuclear disarmament. The question that I have in mind is if those who are pursuing nuclear weapons ambitions, I'll use those terms right now, are pursuing it for their own security interests, which you have suggested are regional security interests as opposed to global nuclear ones and vis-à-vis the U.S., China or Russia.

How can the pursuit of nuclear disarmament really lead – by the P5 – really lead to a situation in which those countries who are currently motivated by their regional security concerns decide to forego those security concerns, and how can pursuit of nuclear disarmament actually lead to greater compliance by all states with their nonproliferation obligation? Last time I read the NPT, the nonproliferation obligations and the pursuit of a path towards nuclear disarmament were obligations that were not tied to each other. So I'm trying to grapple with all of these various issues and all of the interconnections, and I'd really appreciate your insight. Thank you.

MR. KIBAROGLU: Well, this is a very elaborate question. Maybe we should take this one now and then turn to Christopher, if you don't mind. Ambassador Fahmy, would you please –

AMB. FAHMY: Yes. Very quickly. You raise a very valid point. That's why in my comments I said we need to have the nuclear weapon states, the Permanent Five start a pathway towards nuclear disarmament. But in order to deal with the immediate security problems in different regions, you need to have in parallel to that security talks between the states directly involved which will be regional per se, or regional plus –



some of the Permanent Five are depending on the different circumstances. The reason why you need the Permanent Five to lead the way is, if you don't have an environment that it's driven towards nuclear disarmament, you don't create the political pressure for states to choose that option, and you don't create a consensus towards downsizing and towards disarmament rather than moving towards competition, states have the legitimate right to secure themselves, and to defend themselves against any threat. They have the choice; either they go up, or they go down, and having the Permanent Five dealing with this issue helps push the lever towards going down, but you cannot solve the regional problems simply through the Permanent Five, and that's why I said you need this parallel track.

MR. KIBAROGLU: Thank you. Christopher.

Q: Thank you. Chris Porter, with the State Department. To prove that Sally Horn and I don't collaborate, I will now not ask the question I had in mind for Ambassador Fahmy. (Laughs.) I will however ask a couple of very – (unintelligible) – questions about the presentations we heard from Pierre Goldschmidt and Martin Briens. Martin, if I could start with you, since I first heard about them a couple of years ago, I've been intrigued by the nonproliferation provisions that the U.N. has now be putting – according to your presentation – more than 90 trade and cooperation agreements. I think that's a very commendable step. My question has to do with now that this has become a well established European practice, what steps are taken to evaluate whether or not, and to what degree these provisions are in fact being complied with, and what happens should they not be? That's my question to you.

And to Pierre, if I could. In your – I fully understand that the U.S.-India initiative is indeed a very controversial one and has been the subject of much debate. It's one on which reasonable people can and do disagree as a policy matter. I was struck however by the phrase in your slide presentation which used the phrase "illegal discrimination under the NPT," and while I would certainly agree that it's controversial, and I have engaged in many debates about its merits, I think describing it as being unlawful under the NPT is at the very least something of an overstatement, and I was wondering on what grounds you would justify that claim. Thanks.

MR. BRIENS: So basically the nonproliferation provision means that should proliferation concerns arise, the first step would be to engage to consultations about it, but then there can be a process, and at the end, ultimately, the implementation of the agreement could be suspended. So far the case has not arisen, and maybe it's a bit too early to assess the implementation of this provision, because we are in the process of inserting it in all these agreements. It's already been inserted in a number of settlements as I said, so we'll see I guess a few years from now to which extents it's implemented on, so it's a bit too early to answer your question, actually.

MR. GOLDSCHMIDT: Yes, on the illegal discrimination, of course I tried to be a little provocative, but essentially, we have heard especially from the Non-Aligned Movement a number of criticism about the imbalance between the three countries who

are outside the NPT and those who are inside the NPT. So there is a discrimination there but it's a legal discrimination, because those who have not joined, have not joined, so they are not bound by the NPT, and then there is the legal discrimination in the NPT between the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons states.

Now, to provide, to give to India all the benefits that are reserved for non-nuclear weapons states joining the NPT, without India committing to even the commitments of the nuclear weapon states under the NPT, I qualify that as an illegal discrimination. So there are legal discriminations that are already criticized, so how come that no one screams about the illegal discrimination, and I would have expected, again, the NAM countries to raise that issue.

Now, it was very interesting to hear that yes, you don't want to criticize India for obtaining a clever agreement. I agree with you. It's fine. India can do that, it's fine. But you can still criticize the agreement. You don't criticize India for obtaining it, but you could at least criticize the U.S. for giving it and say that this is not a fair deal.

And since I have the word, I would just say I'm happy that in fact, we have very little disagreement with what you said because you said the first thing is that the weakness of the NPT is due to the lack of progress on the disarmament issue. Well, I think before discussing whether you can disarm completely and go to zero, the first thing is to ratify the CTBT, and that you're committing not to test new weapons. I think this is a very clear and simple indication of your willingness that in the longer term you are not going to develop more sophisticated weapons. It's a simple and very viable first step, so I think we're in agreement.

Then you said – we will complicate the system, we should not complicate it for those who do not intend to cheat. Well, what I proposed – I was very careful about it – I said, you only complicate the life for those who have been found in violation. So I'm not asking for any additional constrain for those who comply, so I think fundamentally, there is a lot of agreement between what you said and what I have proposed. I will stop there.

AMB. FAHMY: Again, I do agree with you. There's much more that we agree upon, but there is a difference. You've suggested, for example, that the additional protocol be mandatory for everybody, and that applies to NPT members who are compliant. I disagree with that. There is no additional obligation in the NPT that makes that mandatory, nor do I think there should be one, especially to countries that have been compliant. So that's one example. Secondly, I'm not questioning the value of the CTBT. What I'm arguing is that – and you gave the example of Egypt correctly, that we have not ratified that. We have not ratified that because in spite of being compliant with the NPT, we have concerns about our security that have not been met, to deal with nuclear weapons and has caused us not to ratify anymore agreements. We have however, been compliant, and that's the message to people. Unless the NPT provides countries with the right to preserve their security, not take it away from them, and unless you deal with that issue, you will face problems in the NPT regime.

MR. KIBAROGLU: Thank you. Yes. Please.

Q: I am Annalisa Giannella from the European Union. First of all, I would like to say the European Union attaches a lot of importance to CTBT, so I was really happy to see the presentation by Pierre Goldschmidt, because we do believe it is a treaty which is an important complement to the existing treaty system, and it is really a first step in the direction of nuclear disarmaments. So it is very important, and I think that U.S. and China should ratify the CTBT. The fact that they are not party to CTBT is proving even a handicap now in the solution of some major nuclear issues. It is a handicap for instance in the negotiations with North Korea, because they cannot even require North Korea to accede to CTBT, which would be in my opinion a very normal condition in the negotiations. Ratification of CTBT has not been imposed by the U.S. on India as a condition for the nuclear deal. Incidentally I think that's even a – (unintelligible) – from productions (so that ?) have been imposed, but ratification of CTBT again it is I would say the bare minimum.

I agree with Ambassador Fahmy that the WMD free zone in the Middle East is a very important issue on which we should be working, and I would like to recall that the EU has together with all the Mediterranean countries a very useful forum. It is called the Barcelona Process, which involves all the country around the Mediterranean Basin, which means Arab countries and also Israel, and we have tried sometime ago to organize a meeting on WMD in the Middle East, and I think this meeting would be a very important effort in which the Mediterranean countries together with the European countries, Mediterranean and not Mediterranean European countries which could play a role of facilitator could start discussing these issues together at the same table, and the only reason why this meeting did not take place was because there was not agreement on one word in the draft agenda of this meeting, although ministers had confirmed their agreement on the principle of this meeting. So I hope, since everybody is speaking again more and more loudly about WMD free zone in the Middle East that we can find an agreement on this agenda, and we can organize this meeting. We continue to consider that it is an important issue.

And I would also like to underline that I agree that noncompliance must be sanctioned, but I also think that compliance should be rewarded, so I think that we don't talk enough and we don't do enough in terms of cooperation on peaceful uses and this is valid for the nuclear area, but also for other areas, and biological area is very important nowadays. So I think that we should work much more in order to prove to NPT and BTWC and CWC state parties that they can get a cooperation, so we need to forge a consensus about compliance, but also in parallel about cooperation.

MR. KIBAROGLU: Thank you for your remarks. The queue is getting longer at this time, so maybe we should take another question this time.

Q: Yes. Peter Nicholls from Abolition 2000 UK, and in association with Abolition 2000 Europe. One area, a problematic area involving the EU is its relationship with NATO, and one matter on which a decision could be made within the NATO

associated states of the EU, and as well as Turkey, is a negotiation for the withdrawal and return to at least to caretaker status of the nuclear weapons, the airdrop nuclear weapons on dual-use arrangements in six EU states and Turkey, which has already happened with the removal of NATO associate nuclear weapons from Greece, the Araxos Base, these airdrop weapons no longer have any conceivable military use. They are purely political and their removal from Europe and from – including Turkey – would be consistent with Blix Commission's recommendations, that nuclear weapons states do not maintain nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear weapons states. This could be one of the biggest European contributions towards nuclear disarmament.

MR. KIBAROGLU: So again remarks – maybe a question. Yes, please.

Q: Yes. Pierce Corden, former U.S. government worker in Arms Control and on nonproliferation issues and with the Test Ban Preparatory Commission in Vienna. A question to Pierre Goldschmidt about his views on what happens if somebody withdraws from the NPT, that they should still be bound by their IAEA safeguards obligations. What is to keep that same state from simply continuing its process and withdrawing from the IAEA, as I think North Korea's actually done? What happens then? Is there much of a real distinction between NPT withdrawal and what would be the follow on possibilities for the IAEA to enforce its safeguards agreements?

On the issue of a regional or let's say G77 interest for Ambassador Fahmy, on the test ban in the Middle East, I can understand Egypt's reluctance to ratify before other Middle Eastern states, in particular Israel, are ready to do so, but I think it's important to note that the only nuclear arms agreement that Israel has signed is the CTBT, and it has been cooperating in the commission with the installation of the monitoring system, and it would be important in my view for Cairo to decide finally to move ahead with the installation of the monitoring system foreseen in that multilateral verification regime in Egypt. A final historical comment about the role of the G77 states: would that we could have overcome the resistance in the conference on disarmament in 1997 by Pakistan to beginning negotiations on a cutoff treaty. At that point, I think we might well have been able to have one with verification and provisions concluded by, let's say 1999 or 2000.

MR. KIBAROGLU: Okay. Before turning to the panel, I would like to invite the last two interventions from the audience, and I'll give you a minute each because our session is almost over. Please, sir.

Q: Dave Thomson, Los Alamos. Just a question or all of you. (Are any ?) really specific proposals for regional mutual really mutual security in the various regions?

MR. KIBAROGLU: Thank you. And the last one, please.

Q: (Unintelligible) – Federal Foreign Office in Berlin. Just a comment. I think one the key problems that we are facing is that I get the sense that the community of state parties have no sense of being a community, that they are in the treaty together, and they are sort of condemned to work for the success of that treaty. In that regard, I think the

EU – and I would like to stress that – is very firmly committed to a balanced approach, which focuses on the three basic pillars of the NPT, and pursues strengthening all three of them, and in this regard, I think I fully share the point of view that Ambassador Fahmy has pointed out, namely that we need, desperately need a new momentum in nuclear disarmament.

Having said that, there must also be a recognition that there is interrelationship between disarmament and nonproliferation which does not only work one way, but both ways. In that regard, I'm somewhat concerned about the flat rejection that I sometimes encounter regarding the adoption of the additional protocol, and possibly beyond that, additional verification requirements as the standard for the implementation of the NPT as the verification standard of the NPT. I think this is not driven by any not reasonable position, but it's driven by the fact and the experience that we have made that in order to effectively verify compliance with the nonproliferation obligations, we have to go beyond the comprehensive safeguards agreement, and the necessary requirements and empowerments need to be in place, and I think that should also be understood, because there must also be an assurance looking out from a nuclear weapons state's side that there is a clear and unambiguous compliance with the nonproliferation requirement. And in that regard, I think also the EU places a lot of importance on strengthening the verification side, as well as the enforcement side of the NPT. Thank you.

MR. KIBAROGLU: Thank you. I'd like to get the answers in the reverse order. Ambassador Fahmy.

AMB. FAHMY: Sure. Very quickly. Let me just be very clear. We support the CTBT, and we support the objective of the additional protocols. Let me be precise: I support the CTBT and the objective (of the ?) additional protocols, but I would not support ratifying the CTBT or taking on additional obligations unless our concerns are taken into account. And let me just explain this a little bit more. Our suggestion to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East would have safeguard requirements beyond the NPT requirements, possibly even beyond the additional protocol requirements, which we will accept upon ourselves, provided everybody else in the region accepts them and we deal with the security issue.

But as was repeated from the very beginning of this conference, countries pursue nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction as a function of their security concerns, and some countries don't want to take additional obligations on themselves, especially that they are complying, when they do not see any obligations being taken by countries who are not members of the NPT and therefore are not observant of these already existing obligations. It comes all the way back to security. If we can find a way to get countries in our region to join the NPT or to apply the additional protocols, we will apply them, but in the absence of their applying to other countries in our region that are a subject of concern, we will not do that, and that's completely consistent with the NPT, which is a treaty made to ensure the security of its members, not the security of the non-members first.

MR. KIBAROGLU: Thank you. I'm sure Mr. Goldschmidt will confine his answer to one minute.

MR. GOLDSCHMIDT: I will try. The question of NPT withdrawal or safeguards withdrawal. The thing is that if a state has a comprehensive safeguard agreement, a non-nuclear state, and withdraws from the NPT, as soon as it withdraws from the NPT, the safeguards agreement comes to an end automatically, and so there is no safeguards on anything that was delivered to this non-nuclear weapons state, because it was a party to the NPT. If they have what I call a 66-type safeguards agreement which are the safeguards agreement you have in India, Pakistan and Israel, these are not by definition linked to being a member or not of the NPT, and therefore, as long as there is nuclear material or facilities to be safeguarded, it remains under safeguard. That was my point, and the case of the DPRK is an example of that. DPRK was free to use all its plutonium after withdrawing from the NPT, so I think we should draw from the lessons.

Yes, concerning the flat rejection of the additional protocol and your answer – this is a big debate. I would submit that I don't think Egypt is gaining by saying, I'm frustrated because Israel is not in the NPT, and so as long as they are not in the NPT, I will not accept the additional protocol. I think the more people – if all countries have an additional protocol, adhere to the additional protocol, it will make your standpoint stronger. The pressure on nuclear weapons states and on non-NPT states will be stronger and not weaker.

I don't think it's a good way to blackmail the international community on security issues because you are not happy about what others are doing, and it is the same thing with the CTBT. It is clearly in Egypt's interest to freeze the situation, not to make it worse, to make sure that Israel is not testing weapons, to make sure that Iran will not test weapons. That's in Egypt's interest. I don't see how you could dispute that, and this is the very first step, so I think you should use your very important leverage in fighting for the ratification of the CTBT instead of refusing to be in the group of those who show how good they are in implementing the safeguard agreement. But we can continue this discussion certainly outside this meeting room. Thank you.

MR. KIBAROGLU: Thank you. Martin, the last word.

MR. BRIENS: Yes. A couple of remarks. First, about the NPT is there a community of state parties or not, I don't know, but what we must remember is that the NPT is still the most universal treaty and even if it has weaknesses and problems and legitimacy issues, et cetera, et cetera, it is a fact that states are still extremely – attach still a lot of importance to the treaty, because it's one key element of collective security, and everybody prefers to have these treaty so that his neighbor doesn't have nuclear weapons, that not having this treaty, and so it's still very important.

Second, about nuclear disarmament, just a short comment. Nuclear weapon states are politically and legally committed to nuclear disarmament under Article Six. Most of them have taken important steps in the '90s and the 2000s to actually carry out this

obligation including irreversible ones in the case of France, and I think nuclear disarmament should go on for its own merits, and we have to be a bit careful about linkages because I'm not sure it reflects the reality of the world, and if a country like Iran or North Korea are pursuing nuclear weapons, it's not because of the nuclear weapon states, nuclear weapons, but maybe as you said because of their security environments, and we have also to address these regional security issues. This I fully agree with.

The last comment is about – I mean, the comment that Annalisa Giannella (meant ?) about the need to better reward compliance. I think it's key. It's key to demonstrate that actually countries which abide by their commitments which even go further are very proactive about them, actually get benefits and have access to nuclear technology to biotechnology, et cetera. And I think this is very important and this is something we must work in the years to come. Thank you.

MR. KIBAROGLU: Thank you, Martin. We had a very useful conversation and very constructive debate here, and I believe these points will have to be considered in the months and years ahead of us, so we are all working for nonproliferation and therefore we should probably not stop here discussing these matters. So I thank you all for your attention and I thank the panelists as well. (Applause.)

(END)