Belgian Nuclear Higher Education Network (BNEN)

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The Challenge of Deterring Nuclear Proliferation

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(speaking notes)

Chairperson,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

INTRODUCTION

- I am very honoured to have been invited by the BNEN to speak on the occasion of the Official Opening of your 5th Academic Year.

- It is undisputable that electricity production from nuclear power plants (NPPs) can play a beneficial role with regard to the greenhouse effect, cost stability, energy independence, balance of payment and most importantly domestic employment, just to mention a few.
  I am in favour of energy savings and diversification of energy sources. Nuclear energy should be part of our energy mix, but not under any circumstances.

- Nuclear energy must be supported by a strong safety culture at all levels and by an adequate scientific and industrial infrastructure. It is therefore essential to have, in sufficient number, well trained nuclear engineers and scientists and to maintain continuity of knowledge. This is the role of Educational Programmes such as the one offered by the BNEN.

- The greatest disincentive for a European electrical utility to invest in new NPPs is the political risk which, to a large extend, is related to the changing attitude of the general public and the media towards nuclear energy. As is well known the political acceptance of nuclear energy can indeed change overnight if, for instance, a nuclear accident occurs in a nuclear facility anywhere else in the world, even if in that State safety standards are much lower than in our own country.

- There are however threats to the development of nuclear energy that have attracted, so far, much less public attention: the security and proliferation risks.

- The security risk includes both sabotage from inside a nuclear facility and external aggression using for instance trucks loaded with high explosives or crashing planes full of kerosene. This is an area which requires the development of appropriate counter-measures.

  I will not dwell further on this topic today.

- Another major risk for the long-term development of nuclear energy worldwide would be a failure of the non-proliferation regime. This is usually not sufficiently well perceived, in particular by the nuclear industry. It is noteworthy that, as far as I know, there are very few courses or lectures on nuclear proliferation in most nuclear engineering post graduate programmes.

- If nuclear energy is to expand worldwide for electricity production, it is essential for the international community to be convinced that its peaceful applications are not and will not be used to develop a nuclear weapon capability.

- As we shall see, this raises a number of technical, legal and political challenges.

DETERRING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

The greater the number of States possessing nuclear weapons, the greater the risk that, one day, by design or accident they will be used or will fall into the hands of non-state actors with catastrophic consequences.

We must therefore reject, as irresponsible, the idea that the international community should get used to the prospect that sooner or later more countries will possess nuclear weapons, and that we can do nothing about it.
Rather, it is essential to take all the necessary steps to "dissuade" and "deter" non-nuclear weapons States (NNWS) from acquiring such weapons.

"**Dissuasion**" entails persuading a State (both the leaders and the people) that it is not in that State's best interest to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

The most remarkable achievement in recent years has been the success of secret diplomacy in convincing Libya's leadership that abandoning its WMD and missile programmes would increase the security and improve the economic development of the country.

"Dissuasion" can mainly, if not exclusively, be achieved through bilateral and multilateral negotiations, in order to create the necessary geo-political environment, including first of all appropriate security guarantees. To be most effective persuasion efforts should be undertaken well in advance of any anticipated crisis. I will not dwell further on this important facet.

"**Deterrence**" plays its role when a NNWS cannot be persuaded that acquiring a nuclear weapons capability is not in its best interest.
It is essential for any such State to know:

- First, that any undeclared nuclear weapons programme has a high probability of **early** detection, and

- Second, that if detected, extremely negative consequences would be **inevitable** (and not simply possible).

Unfortunately, neither of these two deterrents is credibly in place today, and it is therefore essential to take the practical steps necessary to improve the situation.

For that, we need to draw on the lessons learned from previous nuclear proliferation crises.

Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) stated: "*In politics what is often most difficult to understand and appraise is what is taking place under our eyes".*

De Tocqueville's insight suggests that it would be wise for the international community to stand back and to reflect on the lessons that should be learned from the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) experience in implementing safeguards over the last decade, particularly in North Korea and Iran. Such review and reflection will suggest that, ironically, just when safeguards are getting better, the political will to use them effectively seems to be waning.

My talk will explore how safeguards have gotten better, what lessons can be gleaned from the IAEA's experience over the last decade, and how the international community can address the problems that have arisen in the past few years.

BRIEF HISTORY

- The IAEA was established in July 1957 as a result of the "Atom for Peace" vision formulated by President Eisenhower in 1953
- In the early 1960's, President J.F. Kennedy, predicted that before the end of the 1970's there would be between 20 and 25 states possessing Nuclear Weapons.
  This prediction, fortunately, did not materialize.
  Since that time only 3 States have tested for the first time a nuclear explosive device (China in 1964, India in 1974 and Pakistan in 1998).
  Two more countries, Israel and more recently North Korea, are assumed to have nuclear weapons.
- Therefore, so far, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which entered into effect in 1970 and the resulting non-proliferation regime can be seen as a success story.
- Indeed, during the 1990's, after the fall of the Soviet Union, all Newly Independent States and previously communist countries from Eastern Europe, joined the NPT, as well as France, Brazil, Argentina and other States from Latin America, and most importantly South Africa (in 1991) after agreeing to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme.
- As of today, the NPT has been ratified by a record number of 188 States.
- Another positive milestone was reached in 1995 when the NPT was extended for an indefinite period.
- And finally, to everyone's surprise, in December 2003, Libya announced that it was abandoning its undeclared nuclear weapon programme, and allowed the US to remove all sensitive material and equipment from the country.

SAFEGUARDS ARE GETTING BETTER

Today, the IAEA safeguards system is being implemented more effectively and efficiently than ever before. Traditionally, the IAEA focused on accounting for nuclear materials in each state facility-by-facility. This work was done only at declared facilities and was largely an

audit. Since 1998, however, the IAEA has developed a global analytical approach that asks not simply whether the declared numbers add up, but also, "*What's going on in this state's nuclear program? Is* ***everything*** *really consistent*?" The new approach depends upon two tools in particular: improved detection technologies, and a detailed analysis of all relevant information available on each state.

At the heart of this approach is the production and periodic update of State Evaluation Reports (SERs). They combine the results of inspections in the field and environmental swipes with analysis of all relevant information from open sources, including satellite imagery. State Evaluation Reports also analyze the history of all anomalies and inconsistencies recorded during previous inspections and examine whether a state's research and development program is internally consistent, corresponds with stated purposes, and points to a commitment to use nuclear technology exclusively for peaceful purposes. The SERs analyze export and import of relevant nuclear material and equipment, and other information available to the IAEA. Every SER also includes a section that examines the most likely diversion scenarios, on the assumption that the state under review intends to divert nuclear material for military purposes. Each report leads to a State specific action plan.

Parallel with these developments, the IAEA has improved its surveillance technology, replacing almost all analogue video cameras with digital surveillance cameras. In 2005, there were more than 120 surveillance and radiation monitoring systems with remote transmission capabilities, ten times more than in 2000.

Progress is also being made in using more advanced equipment such as ground penetration radar to improve the IAEA's ability to verify that highly complex nuclear facilities conform to their official design.

The IAEA has also established a new R&D project to explore the potential use of advanced technologies in detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities at a distance.

[In addition, in response to the discovery in 2004 of the extensive covert supply network of sensitive nuclear technology masterminded by Dr.A.Q.Khan (the so called "father" of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme) which came to light as a result of Libya's disclosure of its clandestine nuclear weapons program, the IAEA Department of Safeguards has established a new unit focused on documenting, investigating and analyzing nuclear trade activities worldwide, with the aim of uncovering the existence of undeclared nuclear activities.]

This more rigorous and resourceful approach to safeguards has led one knowledgeable commentator (Richard Hooper – IAEA Bulletin – June 2003) to assert that "*changes in structure and practices of the Safeguards Department have been accompanied by a change in culture that is more of a revolution than evolution.*" This "*radical departure from the past practice*" was also acknowledged in the US Government Accountability Office Report of October 2005 on Nuclear Non-proliferation.

To be sure, there are still difficulties inherent in ensuring that, in "bulk facilities", even small amounts of nuclear material—a few kilograms among tons—are not diverted without timely detection, but the trend in the capacity of the safeguards system is clearly positive.

It is widely recognized that notwithstanding their limitations, verification activities by the IAEA's inspectors and analysts, are extremely valuable, indeed irreplaceable. No other international organization would ever be able to carry out a similar job. The IAEA must therefore be supported by all means.

Unfortunately, the international community has failed to strengthen the Agency's authority to exercise its improved capacity in precisely the situations where it is most necessary: namely, when a state has been found to be **in non-compliance** with its safeguards undertakings.

THREE MAJOR CRISES NEED TO BE MENTIONED IN THIS REGARD

IRAQ

At the time of the first Gulf War, in 1991, the world discovered that Iraq had been developing over more than a decade, a secret nuclear weapon programme completely separate from its civil nuclear programme declared to and inspected by the IAEA. The international community acknowledged thereafter that it was not enough for the IAEA to verify that the initial declaration of a State under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement is correct but that it was also necessary to verify that it was complete. To achieve that goal, it was obvious that the Agency needed broader access rights to information and locations. It took until May 1997 for the IAEA Board of Governors to approve the so called "Model Protocol Additional" designed to enable the Agency to provide the assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear material and activities in a non-nuclear-weapon State (NNWS) party to the NPT. As of today, 78 States have an Additional Protocol in force. However, some 20 NNWS party to the NPT having known nuclear activities do not yet have an Additional Protocol in force. Among those at least three -Argentina, Brazil and Iran- have uranium enrichment activities.

The international community should demand much more forcefully that such States sign and ratify the Additional Protocol, and the IAEA should mention them explicitly in its annual report.

[The Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) could also play a significant role in this respect by adopting a rule that no nuclear material, equipment and know-how would be transferred to any country having conversion, enrichment or reprocessing activities unless they have an Additional Protocol in force and unless these and all other nuclear facilities are covered by an INFCIRC/66-type safeguards Agreement[1] which, in contrast to CSA, remains in force even if the State withdraws from the NPT.]

NORTH KOREA

- Since 1993 North Korea has been declared every year by the IAEA to be in non-compliance with its safeguards agreements and reported to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), without the latter deciding to take any action.

- In 2003, North Korea notified that it was withdrawing from the NPT (the first time this has happened in the history of the Treaty) and in 2004 declared possessing nuclear weapons, without any move from the UNSC because of China threatening to use its veto right against any resolution adverse to North Korea.

[1] A Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement remains in force only for so long as the state remains party to the NPT, whereas under a INFCIRC/66-type agreement, all nuclear material supplied or produced under that agreement would remain under safeguards, even if the state withdraws from the NPT, until such time the IAEA has determined that such material is no longer subject to safeguards

IRAN

The same scenario is now unfolding with Iran.
If the international community does not seem to have learned the lessons from the crisis in North Korea, Iran has.
It is, as we shall see, preparing to follow the same steps as North Korea if the development of its nuclear programme is threatened by the UNSC or any of its members.

One should remember that in November 2003, in a damning report to its Board of Governors, the IAEA revealed that Iran had for the past eighteen years been pursuing an undeclared centrifuge uranium enrichment programme and had concealed a considerable number of nuclear facilities, materials and activities in violation of its safeguards obligations. This should have been reported to the UNSC as foreseen in the Agency's Statute. It was not, for a number of reasons.

First because many countries insisted, as indicated in the IAEA's report, that "*to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme*", even if everyone was well aware that the Agency had neither the authority nor the means required to prove that this could be the case before it is too late.

Secondly, Iran was not reported to the Security Council because of the fear of many Member States that if the issue got out of the IAEA's hands it could initiate a scenario similar to the one that led to the conflict in Iraq.

Also, there was the fear that if Iran was referred to the Security Council, Russia and China would use their veto right to block any resolution adverse to the Islamic Republic, as was the case for North Korea, with no concrete outcome whatsoever.

This explains why, during the last quarter of 2003, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the so-called EU-3) opted for a diplomatic approach in exchange for a commitment by Tehran to suspend all enrichment related activities. It is regrettable that the US did not, at that time, actively support these efforts. This has been a major missed opportunity.

Three years later, ignoring the repeated requests of the IAEA, Iran has continued its tactics of obfuscation and delay and has made significant progress in developing its nuclear programme. It now has a stockpile of more than 100 tons of natural uranium hexafluoride (the feed material for the enrichment process) safely stored in underground tunnels. It is also producing low enriched uranium in its pilot enrichment plant and is continuing the construction of the large underground enrichment facility at Natanz. Iran has also made significant progress with respect to its intermediate ballistic missiles, which now appear capable of carrying a nuclear warhead a distance of 2000 Km or more.

Although the Agency revealed, in November 2005, and confirmed in January 2006 that Iran had been found in possession of documents for "*the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres,* ***related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components***" in violation of Article II of the NPT, and that the Agency had obtained information concerning "*tests related to high explosive and the design of missile re-entry vehicle, all of which could have a military nuclear dimension*", it was not until February 4, 2006 that the Board of Governors finally decided to inform the UNSC.

It took another seven months for the UNSC to adopt, on 31 July 2006, a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter demanding that Iran "*suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development*".
The resolution also expresses the Security Council's "*determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA process*" and calls "*upon Iran to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol and to implement without delay all transparency measures as the IAEA may request in support of its ongoing investigation*". It seems however that this formulation does not provide the IAEA with the legally binding authority the Agency has repeatedly stated is needed in Iran. This is another major missed opportunity, all the more baffling, given that such a demand does not in any way involve sanctions, and therefore should find unanimous support in the Security Council.

The tardiness of the Security Council in making the necessary decisions has mainly been due to the attitude of Russia and China, both of which have and still are threatening to veto any UNSC resolution adverse to Iran. Everyone agrees that a diplomatic solution to the crisis would be by far the best. But a weak and divided Security Council will not help in this regard.

As is well known the May 2005 NPT Review Conference has been a complete failure, in part because of Egypt uncompromising negotiation stance, and in part because of the lack of progress by the 5 NWS with regard to the implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed upon in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, "*for the systematic and progressive [disarmament] efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT*". This has been a major cause of frustration among almost all NNWS. If the most powerful nations on earth insist, as they have in recent years, that they need to maintain and further improve their nuclear arsenals, how can they convince weaker nations that they don't need those weapons even as a deterrence?

And, as if all this was not enough to undermine the credibility of the NPT, in July 2005 the US offered India a broad nuclear cooperation agreement, granting India all the benefits that are reserved for non-nuclear weapon States under the NPT, without requesting from India any real counterbalancing commitment such as ratifying the Nuclear Comprehensive Test ban Treaty (CTBT)[2]. If the US now succeeds in curbing the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) export rules for what the US has unilaterally defined as the "special case" of India, it is hard to see why Russia, China and others would not feel free to strike similar deals with countries such as Pakistan and Iran.

Is it therefore too late to salvage the credibility of a Treaty ratified by 188 States and which has been, until recently, an indisputable success? Unfortunately, the answer is most likely: Yes, unless the international community without further delay acts upon the lessons learned in Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Iran and takes the necessary actions.

THE LESSONS LEARNED

One has first to acknowledge that in the late 1960's, when the NPT was drafted, it was not anticipated that one day it would be possible to enrich uranium in a rather small-scale centrifuge facility, which consumes very little electricity and, if manufactured domestically,

[2] It is quite astonishing that NNWS and in particular those belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement did not react (more) strongly to the announcement of this agreement.

can rather easily be assembled at an undeclared and almost undetectable location. Also, today, unlike large uranium gas diffusion enrichment plants a declared uranium centrifuge enrichment plant, producing LEU for peaceful purposes and placed under IAEA safeguards can, if the State withdraws from the NPT, rapidly be reconfigured to produce weapons-grade HEU.

Article IV of the NPT states that it is "*the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty*". The reference to Article II is particularly important because it states, inter alia, that "*each non-nuclear weapons State Party to the Treaty undertakes [...] not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons*".
As indicated above, not only was Iran found to be in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, it was also found in possession of documents "*related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components*" in violation of Article II of the NPT.
Thereby, Iran's "inalienable right" to develop sensitive fuel cycle activities such as uranium enrichment can legitimately be suspended by a decision of the Security Council, as was requested in its resolution of July 31, 2006.
[Comparison with driving licence]

Another lesson that has been learned is that there is a need to look beyond nuclear material.

The Director General's November 2004 report stated: "*It should be noted that the focus of Agency Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols is nuclear material, and that, absent some nexus to nuclear material, the Agency's legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is limited*."

The limitation of the IAEA's focus on nuclear material is a major issue that has not been properly addressed by the international community. Much more than nuclear material is needed to build a nuclear weapon. Nuclear weaponization activities not involving nuclear material can be numerous and detectable.

Under a narrow legal interpretation of the IAEA's mandate and authority expressed by the language quoted above, the Agency would have to **prove** that undeclared nuclear material and activities **are related to a nuclear weapons program**. To do so the IAEA would have to find at least traces of nuclear material at an undeclared facility that can clearly be linked to equipment, material, or activities that could **only** be relevant to manufacturing nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Such a narrow interpretation establishes a sleuthing standard that IAEA inspectors could hardly ever meet.

Indeed, the sensitive equipment, material, and activities involved in a non-exclusively peaceful nuclear program would most likely be located at secret military sites. Yet, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the IAEA to access such sites **in a timely manner** under the standard CSA and even the Additional Protocol. Experience has demonstrated that so many limitations can be imposed on IAEA inspectors when they get to such sites, that it is extremely unlikely that they would be able to **prove** that nuclear materials have been diverted to the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device. [Even if such a conclusion could be drawn, it would likely be so late in the process of manufacturing nuclear weapons that it would be too late to deter the state from withdrawing from the NPT and rapidly manufacture NWs.]

It is therefore essential for the IAEA to be understood to have the mandate and the authority to look for **any indication** that a non-nuclear-weapon state may be undertaking activities that could signal the existence of a nuclear weapons program, and to report such findings to the

IAEA Board of Governors. It is encouraging to note that the IAEA Secretariat is progressively heading in that direction.

SO HOW CAN THE NON PROLIFERATION REGIME BE STRENTHENED?

In the present geo-political environment and considering in particular the frustration of most NNWS regarding the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament by the 5 NWS, any attempt to amend the NPT or CSA or the Model AP would be doomed to failure, if not counter-productive.
One should definitely avoid penalizing all Member States because a couple of States have violated their commitments. It is therefore important to focus our attention on those States that have been in non-compliance and those which are withdrawing or threatening to withdraw from the NPT.

Non compliance

If a State has been found by the IAEA to be in non-compliance with its safeguards undertakings, experience with both North Korea and Iran has shown that, in order to conclude in a **timely** manner that there is no undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State as a whole, the Agency needs verification rights extending beyond those of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.

This appears clearly from the Director General's report of 28 April 2006 to the IAEA Board of Governors, where it is stated that "*the Agency is **unable** to make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran*", nor can it assess "*the role of the military in Iran's nuclear programme*".

The report also states that "*any progress in that regard requires […] transparency that goes beyond the measures prescribed in the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol*"[3].

Already in September 2005 the Board of Governors adopted a resolution urging Iran "*to implement transparency measures which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocol*".

The problem here is that such IAEA Board resolutions do not provide the Agency with any additional legally binding verification authority.

The most effective, unbiased and feasible way to establish the necessary measure is for the UNSC to adopt (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) a **generic** (i.e. not State specific) and legally **binding** resolution stating that if a State is reported by the IAEA to be in **non-compliance**:

a. the non-compliant State will have to suspend all sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities for a specified period of time,[4] but could by all means continue to produce electricity from nuclear power plants,

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[3] This report also states that: *"Additional transparency measures, including access to documentation, dual use equipment and relevant individuals, are,[…], still needed for the Agency to be able to verify the scope and nature of Iran's enrichment programme, the purpose and use of the dual use equipment and materials purchased by the PHRC* [Physics Research Center] *and the alleged studies which could have a military dimension*".

[4] At least as long as the IAEA has not drawn the conclusion that the State declaration is correct and complete, or possibly longer, in line with what Dr. ElBaradei has called a "*rehabilitation period*" or a "*probation period, to*

b. if requested by the IAEA, the UNSC would automatically adopt a **specific** resolution (under Article 41 of the UN Charter) making it mandatory for the non-compliant State to provide the Agency with the necessary additional verification authority until it has been able to conclude that there is no undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State and that its declarations to the Agency are correct and complete, and

c. no nuclear material would henceforth be delivered to that State without the guarantee that all nuclear material and facilities declared to the IAEA would remain under Agency's safeguards even if the State withdraws from the NPT.

Withdrawal from the NPT

Coming back to Iran, one has to admit that, while the international community was debating what to do, Iranian leaders have made stunning advances in mastering all technological aspects of uranium conversion and enrichment without incurring any negative repercussion. Although they have no use for domestically produced low enriched uranium (LEU) for peaceful purposes for at least the next 10 years, Iran is nonetheless busy installing centrifuge enrichment cascades at Natanz.

By ignoring the repeated requests of the IAEA Board of Governors and recently of the UNSC to suspend these activities, Iran is jeopardising any chance of concluding a broad cooperation agreement with the P5 and Germany that would open the door to large foreign investments, high tech transfers and security guarantees.

By cleverly using to their advantage the divisions among the major powers, by fuelling the fears of a rapid rise in oil prices and by threatening to share their sensitive nuclear know-how (including uranium enrichment) with other states and to increase their support to terrorist movements in the region, Iran's leaders seem confident that the UNSC will be unable to agree on any significant sanction and that if, eventually, it does, it will further increase the popular support for Iran to carry on its nuclear programme.

Isn't Iran's deliberately provocative attitude a step to prepare for its withdrawal from the NPT, as is the letter addressed on May 7, 2006 by the Iranian Parliament to Secretary General Kofi Annan, threatening to force Iran's government to withdraw from the NPT if pressure continues for Tehran to suspend uranium enrichment activities.

Most recently, on September 5, it was announced that the Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission is considering a bill which would suspend all IAEA inspections in Iran, in clear violation of Iran's safeguards agreement and tantamount to withdrawing from the NPT.

It is therefore essential for the international community not to wait for Iran's withdrawal from the NPT[5] and for the UNSC to adopt (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) a **generic** and

build confidence again, before you can exercise your full rights". (cf. interview with Newsweek- January 23, 2006)

[5] or similar actions such as denying IAEA inspectors access to its territory, which would make it impossible for the Agency to fulfil its verification mandate.

legally **binding** resolution stating that if a State **withdraws** from the NPT **after** being found by the IAEA to be in **non-compliance** with its safeguards undertakings:

a. such withdrawal constitutes a threat to international peace and security as defined under Article 39 of the UN Charter; and

b. all materials and equipment made available to such a State, or resulting from the assistance provided to it under a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement will be forthwith removed from that State under IAEA supervision and remain under Agency's Safeguards.

CONCLUSION

The very much publicized divisions among the five veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council, on how the Council should deal with the crisis in North-Korea and Iran is profoundly damaging the credibility of the non-proliferation regime and encourages States found to be in non-compliance with their safeguards agreements to defiantly ignore the resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council.
This is why I believe it is so urgent for the UNSC to adopt the generic resolutions suggested in this paper.

Inaction may lead to Kennedy's prediction coming true, with dreadful consequences for international security, particularly if one takes into account the new dimension of international terrorism.

Einstein said: "*The world will not be destroyed by those who do evil, but by those who let them do and refuse to intervene*".
